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I. INTRODUCTION

For the prevention of unjust enrichment of a defendant the courts
make available a number of restitutionary remedies to a plaintiff.

These remedies developed separately, and they differ somewhat in
their characteristics, but during recent years writers have seen that
there is a single principle underlying them all, whether they are
administered at law or in equity.
At law the principal remedy is quasi contract, sometimes called a
contract implied in law.' The court of appeals draws a distinction
between such an obligation and a contract implied in fact in the case
of Mefford v. City of Dupontonia.2 The latter, it is indicated, is a
true contract and subject to the protection of the Tennessee Code
section affording treble damages for procurement of breach of contract;3 but the former "is not within the protection of [the section]

since it is not really a contract at all, but simply an obligation to pay
for services imposed by law, without consent, and enforced by action
ex contractu."4 The "implied contract to pay a reasonable [attorney's]
fee," held to exist in Interstate Life & Accident Insurance Co. v. RKO
Teleradio Pictures, Inc.5 was clearly a contract implied in fact rather
than a quasi contract.
*Dean, Vanderbilt University School of Law; author, Cases and Materials on
Restitution (1958).
1. The classic exposition is Lord Mansfield's opinion in the famous case of Moses
v. Macferlan, 2 Burr. 1005, 97 Eng. Rep. 676 (K.B. 1760). See also RESTATEMENT,
REsTrrrrON 4-10 (1937).
2. 354 S.W.2d 823 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1961).
3. TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-1706 (1956).
4. 354 S.W.2d at 826, citing Weatherly v. American Agricultural Chem. Co., 16
Tenn. App. 613, 623, 65 S.W.2d 592, 598 (M.S. 1933).
5. 201 F. Supp. 574 (W.D. Tenn. 1962).
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II. RESCISSION
In four cases which were brought by complainants to rescind or
cancel a contract the court recognized the availability of the equitable
remedy. In each case, however, the facts were held not to warrant
the remedy. In Schlickling v. Georgia Conference Ass'n Seventh-Day
Adventists,6 cancellation of a conveyance was sought on the ground
of mental incompetency and undue influence. The court analyzed the
evidence through some thirty-two pages and concluded that the
chancellor below was in error in letting the case go to the jury and
that he should have held for the defendant as a matter of law.
In Pipkin v. Lentz,7 a grantor sought to rescind conveyances on the
ground of fraud and inadequacy of consideration. Affirming the court
below, the court of appeals held that the charge of fraud was not
proved and that "mere inadequacy of consideration is not a ground for
rescission." "If this young man did, in fact, make a bad bargain, he
has no one to blame but himself .... [I]t was the complainant who
initiated these deals and.., he was well aware of what he was doing
....The courts should not assume a paternalistic role when the rights
of persons who are sui juris are involved."8 An additional reason for
the decision lay in the delay in seeking relief.
Wimberley v. Wimberey involved a support contract. Aged parents had conveyed a farm to complainants, reserving a life estate.
Complainants later conveyed to defendants (a nephew of complainant
and his wife) with provision that the mother should always have a
home on the farm. Defendants later moved from the farm to town
and offered to take the mother with them, but she refused to go. It
was held that there was not a breach of a support contract which the
complainants could enforce, though the mother's right to relief was
not affected by the ruling. A rescission of a deed is seldom granted for
breach of contract unless it is a support contract. Here the court
felt that the complainants had themselves violated the spirit of the
contract and relief to them gave no assurance of relief to the parent.
Lindsey-Davis Co. v. Siskin10 involved a bill to rescind an assignment of a judgment. The court held that a demurrer was properly
sustained to the bill on the ground that it failed to allege a tender of
the consideration received, and "a contract will not be rescinded if the
6. 355 S.W.2d 469 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1961).

7. 354 S.W.2d 87 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1961). This case is also discussed in Smedley,
Equity-1962 Tennessee Survey, 16 VAND. L. BEv. 761, 764-66 (1963).
8. 354 S.W.2d at 92. The sentence order has been altered for sake of clarity.
9. 360 S.W.2d 779 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1960).

10. 358 S.W.2d 331 (Tenn. 1962). This case is also discussed in Smedley, Equity
-1962 Tennessee Survey, 16 VAN4D. L. Rlv 761, 771-72 (1963).
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parties cannot be placed in status quo."" The basis on which the
rescission is sought is not clear from the opinion.
III. ILLEGAL CoNTRACrS

In Conner v. Holbert,12 plaintiff purchased certain property, having
it conveyed to his wife. His effort here to establish a resulting trust
in his favor was repelled on the ground that he had placed the
property in his wife's name for the purpose of defrauding creditors
and was therefore coming into equity with unclean hands. It is
customary in cases involving illegal contracts to refuse to grant any
restitutionary relief on the grounds that the parties are in pari delicto.
Relief is granted only if fraud or duress or some other reason causes
the parties not to be regarded as being in pari delicto or if some other
exception to the maxim is found to apply.1 3 Thus, although a usurious
contract is illegal, the duress and economic pressure which the creditor
exercises over the debtor is held to keep the parties from being in
parl delicto, and the debtor can recover usurious interest paid. 4
This is expressly recognized in Tennessee by statute. 5 In Tanner v.
Mobley, 6 the court seems to say that the statutory right is exclusive. It
interprets the statute as making the right of recovery a personal one,
so that a grantee of a mortgagor is held to have no right to recover
7
usurious payments made on the mortgage.1
IV. PAYMENT UNDER LEGAL COMPULSION

In Woods Lumber Co. v. MacFarland8 plaintiff had paid a corporate excise tax assessed against it and sued for a refund on the
ground that its net earnings were not properly apportioned between
Tennessee and Arkansas. The action of the chancellor in giving partial relief was affirmed.
When a surety is required to pay the debt of his principal he is
entitled to indemnity. 9 This restitutionary principle was applied in
11. 358 S.W.2d at 333.
12. 354 S.W.2d 809 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1961).
13. For general treatment, see Wade, Restitution of Benefits Acquired Through
Illegal Transactions, 95 U. PA. L. REv. 261 (1947).
14. Id. at 271.
15. TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-1617 (1956).
16. 209 Tenn. 490, 354 S.W.2d 446 (1962).
17. For other cases during the survey period involving usury, see Rush v. Chattanooga DuPont Employees' Credit Union, 358 S.W.2d 333 (Tenn. 1962), and
Adams'v. Schwartz, 356 S.W.2d 597 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1960).
18. 209 Tenn. 667, 355 S.W.2d 448 (1962).
19. REsTATE-mENT, REsTrrUTIoN § 76 (1937).
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Kincaid v. Alderson.20 Alderson and wife mortgaged their mobile
home to Commercial Credit Corporation, the installment payments
including premiums on an insurance policy on Alderson's life, Alderson
contracted to sell the house to Kincaid, contracting to execute title on
payment of the amount due on the mortgage. Alderson died and the
insurance proceeds paid off the mortgage. The Kincaids then brought
an action against Mrs. Alderson to compel execution of a clear title.
The court declined to grant the relief. It explained that Kincaid was
primarily liable on the mortgage, and when Alderson died and his
insurance paid it, this was the same thing as if he had been a surety
paying the debt of his principal. "When the debt is thus paid the
surety is subrogated to the rights of the creditor .... This payment
constitutes 'an unjust enrichment of the principal" who must 'reimburse the surety to the extent of the enrichment.'"21
A. ContributionBetween Joint Tortfeasors
The very interesting question as to whether Tennessee recognizes
contribution between joint tortfeasors is presented in the case of
Huggins v. Graves v. Adams.2 It was brought before the federal
court, which was bound by Tennessee law, which it carefully traced
and discussed in reaching the conclusion that contribution is allowed
within the state.
Early Tennessee cases had followed the English decision of Merryweather v. Nixanr in denying relief. 24 In Central Bank & Trust Co.
v. Cohn, however, the supreme court granted contribution between
converters of property when the plaintiff was a mere technical converter with no moral guilt. Subsequently, in Cohen v. Noel,26 the
court held, in accordance with the general common law rule, that
indemnity (not contribution) might be had when the defendant's
20. 209 Tenn. 597, 354 S.W.2d 775 (1962). This case is also discussed in Covington, Insurance-1962 Tennessee Survey, 16 VAsD. L. REv. 773, 787-89 (1963); Lacey,
Creditor's Rights and Security Transactions-1962 Tennessee Survey, 16 V.umD. L. REV.
706, 709-11 (1963).
21. 354 S.W.2d at 778, citing REsTATMENT, SECUnrTY § 104(2), comment h
(1941). See also REsTATEMENT, RmsarrursoN §§ 76, 80 (1937).
22. 210 F. Supp. 98 (E.D. Tenn. 1962). By a mixup in patients, plaintiff, who
was scheduled for a hemorrhoidectomy, received instead an orchidectomy. (Look
this latter term up if you do not appreciate the enormity of the injury.) Suit was
against the surgeon and the hospital, and they brought in the anesthetists under the
federal third party practice, seeking indemnity or contribution. Under a jury verdict
the court found indemnity inappropriate, but allowed contribution.
23. 8 T.R. 186, 101 Eng. Rep. 1337 (K.B. 1799). This case involved intentional
wrongdoers and commentators have interpreted it as limited to that situation, but
decisions quickly applied it to negligent tortfeasors.
24. Rhea v. White, 40 Tenn. 121 (1859); Anderson v. Saylors, 40 Tenn. 551 (1859).
See also Maxwell, Saulspaw & Co. v. Louisville & N.R.R., 1 Tenn. Ch. 8 (1872).
25. 150 Tenn. 375, 264 S.W. 641 (1924).
26. 165 Tenn. 600, 56 S.W.2d 744 (1933).
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27 On
negligence was active and the plaintiffs was merely passive.
the basis of these two cases the supreme court held that contribution
was allowable between negligent tortfeasors in Davis v. Broad Street
Garage.28 This case was widely regarded as laying down a general
rule in Tennessee in favor of contribution, although there was some
language in the opinion about active and passive negligence which
indicated a possible confusion between contribution and indemnity.
This conclusion was sustained by the holding in American Casualty
Co..v. Billingsley,29 but shortly thereafter the decision in Vaughn v.
Gil3 once again raised doubts. Here the supreme court held that
contribution would not be allowed because the plaintiff had not lost
anything, the judgment having been paid by his insurance company,
which was therefore subrogated to his rights, and which was not
shown to have been a party to the action. This settled the case, but
the opinion continued with dicta suggesting that contribution could
not be had unless the injured party had obtained judgments against
both of the tortfeasors, so that they were "under a common burden
or liability." This viewpoint was sharply criticized,3 1 and it may be
significant that the supreme court withdrew it from official publication. An extensive dictum in Stewart v. Craig2 indicates that the
rule of the Davis case is still applicable.33 Casual and ambiguous
remarks in two other cases 34 are apparently not significant.

27. On a later trial, it was found that the negligence of both parties was active,
and indemnity was not allowed. Cohen v. Noel, 21 Tenn. App. 51, 104 S.W.2d 1001
(M.S. 1937).
28. 191 Tenn. 320, 232 S.W.2d 355 (1950). The decision is approved in 4 VAND.
L. REv. 907 (1951) and 21 TENN. L. Rv. 672 (1950).
29. 195 Tenn. 448, 260 S.W.2d 173 (1953).
30. 264 S.W.2d 805 (Tenn. 1953).
31. See Wade, Restitution-1954 Tennessee Survey, 7 VAND. L. REv. 941, 948-50
(1954); Sturdivant, Joint Tortfeasors in Tennessee and the New Third-Party Statute,
9 VAD.L. REv. 69, 74-76 (1955); LaFerry v. Ajax Truck Rentals, 161 F. Supp. 707,
709 (E.D. Tenn. 1958) (opinion of Darr, J.).
32. 208 Tenn. 212, 344 S.W.2d 761 (1961).
33. In speaking of a case decided in 1916, the court said that the decision in that
case "was made necessary by the then accepted rule in this State that there could be
no contribution between joint tort-feasors .... ." It then referred to Davis v. Broad
Street Garage, supra note 28, saying that it held that contribution is still not possible
when the tort-feasors were "guilty of a willful tort, an immoral act, or where
consciously violating the law," but also "held that where the joint tort-feasor was
guilty of mere passive or negative negligence that he may recover a contribution
where other joint tort-feasors have contributed more proximate, positive or active
negligence to the injury." It adds that the holding "was subsequently approved" by
American Cas. Co. v. Billingsley, supra note 29, "and has been followed in other
unreported cases." 208 Tenn. at 215-16, 344 S.W.2d at 762. There was, significantly, no
reference made to Vaughn v. Gill, supra note 30, or the limitations which it might
possibly impose.
34. In Yellow Cab Co. v. Pewitt, 44 Tenn. App. 572, 581, 316 S.W.2d 17, 21
(M.S. 1958), a casual remark about "the rule of no contribution between" tortfeasors played no part in the decision. It was regarded as not significant in the Huggins
case.
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Carefully reviewing the Tennessee authorities,3 the court in the

Huggins case reached the conclusion that Davis v. Broad Street Garage currently sets forth the Tennessee law that contribution will be

allowed between negligent tortfeasors, and that the limitation suggested by the dictum in Vaughn v. Gill "is not binding as the law of

Tennessee."'6 Judge Wilson's opinion is a valuable and useful one, 37
and there is every reason to believe that the state supreme court will
agree with the conclusion when a proper case arises before it.3
In the recent case of O'Rear v. Oman Constr. Co., 362 S.W.2d 217 (Tenn. 1962),
the court referred to the case of Stewart v. Craig, supra note 32. That case had held
that a covenant not to sue when given to an employee had the effect of releasing his
employer, whose only liability was vicarious and derivative through the employee.
It said of that case that "it is at least a step away from that very unjust enrichment
rule of no contribution between joint tort-feasors." And in the succeeding sentence,
though in a different paragraph, it said: "Tennessee is the only State in the Union now
adhering to the aforesaid rule." Id. at 218. There is here very plainly an ellipsis or
omission of some words or a sentence. The "aforesaid rule" cannot refer to a rule of
no-contribution, not only because it is almost certain that such a rule does not now
exist in Tennessee but also because even if it did exist Tennessee could not by
any possible interpretation be the only state to follow it. Instead, the court must
have been referring to the rule of Mink v. Majors, 39 Tenn. App. 50, 279 S.W.2d 714
(W.S. 1953), to the effect that money paid by one joint tortfeasor for a covenant not
to sue cannot be credited pro tanto against any recovery from another joint tortfeasor.
In the Stewart case, the court quoted a previous Survey article (Wade, Torts-1956
Tennessee Survey, 9 VAND. L. REv. 1137, 1154 (1956)) that the Mink rule "'is
apparently unique to the state of Tennessee. Courts everywhere all disagree with it'"
and then it proceeded "to the conclusion that insofar as the Mink case disagrees with
what we have said herein we disapprove its holding." 208 Tenn. at 222, 344 S.W.2d
at 762. In any event the question of contribution between joint tortfeasors was not
before the court in any fashion in the O'Rear case. The remark was obiter, made
without detailed consideration or review of the authorities, and it surely will not be
treated as controlling on the matter.
35. The court cited and relied on the articles cited note 31 supra.
36. 210 F. Supp. at 104.
37. The only criticism which can be made of the opinion in the Huggins case is
of its suggestion twice that in Tennessee an action for contribution must be by bill
in equity. 210 F. Supp. at 103, 105. It may be by a bill in equity, and was, perhaps,
in a majority of the cases; but it may instead be in quasi contract, and was so in
several Tennessee cases. See, e.g., Cohen v. Noel, 165 Tenn. 600, 56 S.W.2d 744
(1933); American Cas. Co. v. Billingsley, 195 Tenn. 448, 260 S.W.2d 173 (1953).
Indeed, in LaFerry v. Ajax Truck Rentals, 161 F. Supp. 707, 709 (E.D. Tenn. 1958),
Judge Darr suggests that the limitation of common burden involved in the Vaughn
v. Gill dictum may be limited to an equitable action and not applicable to a law
action.
38. Even the earlier cases which bad denied restitution had done so on the ground
that authority required it and had indicated that the just rule would be otherwise.
See, e.g., Anderson v. Saylors, 40 Tenn. 551, 552 (1859) ("whatever may have been
• . . the apparent right of the one, on principles of natural justice, to have such contribution"); Maxwell, Saulspaw & Co. v. Louisville & N.R.R., 1 Tenn. Ch. 8, 15 (1872)
("equitable contribution among tort-feasors is not inequitable").
As Justice Burnett said in Davis v. Broad Street Garage, 191 Tenn. 320, 325-26, 232
S.W.2d 355, 357-58 (1950), the allowing of contribution between negligent tortfeasors "may be a further extension of the exceptions to the rule as heretofore applied
by the courts of this State. If it is, justice and right demand that this further extension to the exceptions be here applied. 'There is obvious lack of sense and
justice in a rule which permits the entire burden of a loss, for which two defendants
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Though Tennessee does not now have a third-party practice and it
-would have been necessary in the state court for the defendants to
pay the judgment and then sue for contribution (or indemnity), the
court held that under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Rule 14),
the third parties might be joined and contribution awarded. This
as a matter of procedure in which the federal rules
was regarded
39
controlled.
V. BENEFITS

WVRONGFULLY

ACQUIRED

In Conner v. Holbert, a husband claimed a curtesy right in real
property of his wife. He had killed her and had been convicted of
voluntary manslaughter, and the question was whether he could acquire the property interest in this unlawful manner. Though a num-

ber of courts have held that the killer must be held to be a constructive
trustee of the property acquired, Tennessee in several early cases
had reached diverse results. 41 The recurrence of the problem resulted

in a statute providing that a person killing another would forfeit all
interest in the other's property which he would have acquired "by
deed, will or otherwise."42 The statute was held in the Conner case
were equally, unintentionally responsible, to be shouldered onto one alone, according
to the accident of a successful levy of execution, the plaintiff's whim or malevolence,
or his collusion with the other wrongdoer, while the latter goes scot free .... ."
Existing authority in Tennessee does not now require this unjust result, and it is hard
to believe that the Tennessee Supreme Court would now reinstate it. The Restatement
of Restitution says that the rule is "explainable only on historical grounds." REsTATE2MNT, REsTrrrroN § 102, comment a (1937).
For good general discussions, see Bohlen, Contribution and Indemnity Between
Tortfeasors, 21 CORNELL L.Q. 522 (1936), 22 id. 569 (1937); Leflar, Contribution and
Indemnity Between Tort!easors, 81 U. PA. L. REv. 130 (1932).
39. Accord, LaFerry v. Ajax Truck Rentals, 161 F. Supp. 707 (E.D. Tenn. 1958);
Vaughn v. Terminal Transp. Co., 162 F. Supp. 647 (E.D. Tenn. 1957). Earlier cases
had held otherwise, Fontenot v. Roach, 120 F. Supp. 788 (E.D. Tenn. 1954); Trammell v. Appalachian Elec. Cooperative, 135 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Tenn. 1955). See, in
accord with the ruling in the instant case, 3 MoonE, FEDmAL PRACTncE- 430 (1948).
40. 354 S.W.2d 809 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1961). See also note 12 supra and accompanying text.
41. In Carter v. Montgomery, 2 Tenn. Ch. 216, 220 (1875), apparently the first
case anywhere involving the problem, the court assumed without discussion that the
killer would inherit. In Box v. Lanier, 112 Tenn. 393, 79 S.W. 1042 (1904), the
court held that a husband killing his wife could not take the wife's choses in action
as survivor, since this involved a common law rule to which the court could engraft an
exception. In Beddingfield v. Estill & Newman, 118 Tenn. 39, 100 S.W. 108 (1907),
decided after the statute was passed, the court agreed with the Box rule that a
husband could acquire no estate in his wife's property but held that when he
already owned the property as a tenant by the entirety, he could not be deprived of
his interest in it. This is contrary to the majority rule; for authorities, see 2 V.D.
L. REv. 145 (1948). See generally Wade, Acqui'tion of Property by Wilfully Killing
Another-A Statutory Solution, 49 HLiv. L. REv. 715 (1936); RESTAT mENT, Esrru-IoN §§ 184-89 (1937).
42. TENN. CODE ANN. § 31-109 (1956) (real property); id. § 31-207 (personal
property).
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to apply to a curtesy interest and to a killing which amounted to a
voluntary manslaughter, and thus accomplished directly the same
result that the constructive trust would have attained. The Conner
case also involves another problem of restitution. Defendant had
converted certain government bonds belonging to his son and had
been held liable for this. He contended that he used them in some
degree to discharge federal tax liability which he apparently contended constituted a tax lien on the property of his wife involved in
the curtesy claim to the real property discussed above. His argument
seems to have been that she was therefore unjustly enriched at his
expense, and that his son, who now had inherited the real property,
was also enriched so that this was an equitable defense to the claim
for conversion of the bonds. The court declared that the pleadings
and proof failed to make out any enrichment and found it unnecessary
to consider a problem of substantive law.
In Tennessee Hospital Service Ass'n v. Strang,43 a woman who

obtained money from plaintiff Hospital Association by filing fraudulent claims was liable for the money received, a decree pro confesso
being rendered against her. The major problem in the case was
whether doctors who had negligently signed certificates supporting
her fraudulent claims would be liable in tort. The court held in the
affirmative.
43. 354 S.W.2d 488 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1961).

